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LIMITATIONS ON RELIGIOUS RIGHTS:
PROBLEMATIZING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE
AFRICAN CONTEXT
Makau wa Mutua
It is not my intention in this article to discuss what limitations,
if any, should or could be placed on religious rights per se. Rather, I
propose to explore the historical experience of religious penetration
and advocacy in a very specific context and demonstrate the
possibilities of conflict between certain forms of evangelistic
advocacy and some human rights norms. With the African theater as
the basic laboratory, I intend to unpack the meaning of religious
freedom at the point of contact between the messianic faiths and
African religions and illustrate how that meeting resulted in a
phenomenon akin to cultural genocide. The main purpose here is not
merely to defend forms of religion or belief but rather to problematize
the concept of the right to the free exercise of messianic faiths, which
includes the right to proselytize in the marketplace of religions. In
societies, such as the African ones where religion is woven into
virtually every aspect of life, its delegitimization can easily lead to
the collapse of social norms and cultural identities. The result, as has
been the case in most of Black Africa, is a culturally disconnected
people, neither African nor European nor Arab. In other words, I shall
argue that imperial religions have necessarily violated the individual
conscience and the communal expressions of Africans and their
communities by subverting African religions. In so doing, they have
robbed Africans of essential elements of their humanity. In as much
as this chapter is a protest, it is also a plea for the better understanding
of African religions, their freedom from imperial faiths, and the
necessity for the rights regime to devise norms and mechanisms for
protecting them. I base this argument on several premises.
Since the right to religious freedom includes the right to be
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left alone - to choose freely whether and what to believe - the rights
regime by requiring that African religions compete in the marketplace
of ideas incorrectly assumes a level playing field. The rights corpus
not only forcibly imposes on African religions the obligation to
compete - a task for which as non-proselytizing, non-competitive,
creeds they are not historically fashioned - but also protects
evangelizing religions in their march towards universalization. In the
context of religious freedom, the privileging by the rights regime of
the competition of ideas over the right against cultural invasion, in a
skewed contest, amounts to condoni7676ng the dismantling of
African religions. I also argue that the playing field, the one crucial
and necessary ingredient in a fair fight, is heavily weighted against
Africans. Messianic religions have either been forcibly imposed or
their introduction was accomplished as part of the cultural package
borne by colonialism. Missionaries did not simply offer Jesus Christ
as the savior of benighted souls; his salvation was frequently a
precondition for services in education and health, which were quite
often the exclusive domain of the church and the colonial state.' It
makes little sense to argue that Africans could avoid acculturation by
opting out of the colonial order; in most cases the embrace of
indigenous societies by the European imperial powers was so violent
and total that conformity was the only immediate option. In making
this argument I shall also rely on notions of human rights law which,
as I shall seek to show, suggest that indigenous beliefs have a right to
be respected and left alone by more dominant external traditions.
This reasoning poses serious questions that go to the root of
1 The case of the Akamba a Kenyan community targeted by European
missionaries for conversion and colonization, was typical. As told by a European
writer, for "most Africans the turn to education (formal European education)
brought a new involvement with the Christian religion. School and church were
closely intertwined because almost everywhere missionary organizations had a
monopoly on educational facilities and expertise. Problems of educational
mobilization, therefore, could not be separated from the problem of adjustment to
a new faith and values. School and church affairs were of vital concern to Africans
seeking to come to terms with the colonial situation .... ." See F. MUNRO,
COLONIAL RULE AMONG THE KAMBA: SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE KENYA HIGHLANDS
1889-1939, 147-148 (1975).
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the rights regime. Some difficulties are obvious. A key ideal of the
human rights movement, and indeed of liberalism, is the unwavering
commitment to the open society in which the freedom to advance,
receive, and disseminate ideas is assumed necessary for the greater
social good. Though not absolute - permissible limitations can be
placed on what ideas and under what circumstances advocacy is
allowed by the law - this commitment creates a rights regime
conundrum in conversations about the universality of human rights
norms. Questions arise about the validity of the advocacy of certain
norms beyond the borders of their origin. The right of advocacy itself
and its centrality in the human rights corpus becomes an issue. Is it
possible, for instance, to question advocacy in connection with other
creeds, ideologies, and institutions? Should advocacy by the
industrial West to spread free markets and democracy to
non-democratic, non-Western cultures, complete with their power to
transform and fundamentally change economic, social, and political
systems, be protected under the human rights regime? Could
theocratic states, for example, seek protection for their political orders
and social systems under the rights corpus? Other examples come to
mind: should human rights law invade cultures that subordinate
women and seek to eradicate gender bias through advocacy? Are
these acceptable forms of advocacy which the human rights
movement should protect? Ultimately, one must ask, who decides
what is good for the universe and what should be advocated
transnationally?
I mention these problems only to indicate the scope of the
dilemma posed by this article; it would require another exercise to
address them. My particular concern here is with a certain historical
experience and the results of that experience: specifically, I shall
address the nature and forms of religious advocacy employed by the
two major messianic religions - Christianity and Islam - in Africa and
the tension between those forms of advocacy and certain norms and
ideals of the human rights movement.
I have organized the article into several parts. First, I briefly
sketch the history of the human rights movement and outline those
ideals within it that are relevant for my purposes. Secondly, I discuss
the view of the messianic religions towards human rights and other
1999
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religious traditions, particularly indigenous religions. My goal here
is to indicate some of the bases for demonizing "the other" and draw
attention to possible contradictions between the human rights corpus
and some of the positions taken by messianic religions. Thirdly, I
briefly review the human rights, constitutional, and other legal bases
for religious freedom and the protection of indigenous religions in
Africa. I then explore the forms of proselytization preferred by both
Islam and Christianity in Africa and the use of coercion, both
physical and cultural, as a tool in that process. The last segment
addresses the tension inherent in the rights regime and the dilemmas
posed to the human rights movement by the practical and historical
experience of evangelization in Africa.
A discussion about limitations on religious rights at first blush
appears to frustrate some of the major ideals of the human rights
movement. It raises the question about the tension between the
restriction of the right to evangelize or advocate a point of view and
one of the central ideals of the human rights movement, the
promotion of diversity and the right to advocate ideas or creeds.2 An
exploration of the manner in which the human rights corpus ought to
view religious rights-whether further to limit or to expand the
protections they currently enjoy - raises this fundamental tension:
2 The movement's emphasis on respect for diversity and tolerance of difference
implies that societies remain permanently open to inquiry, change, and challenge;
it could be argued that this philosophy betrays the bias of the human rights corpus
for a liberal, democratic society, a favoritism that could diminish the movement's
claim of universality. But scholars of the movement argue that with the possible
exception of itself, "That movement institutionalizes no one ideal of social order.
To the contrary, it explicitly allows for many faiths and ideologies while denying
to any one among them the right or power to impose itself by force. It expresses a
humanistic commitment to ongoing inquiry and diversity, as well as a deep
skepticism about any final truth. It denies governments the right to close avenues
of reflection, criticism, advocacy, and innovation in order to impose an orthodoxy
... ." Henry Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy
Regimes for Minorities, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1552 (1991). Steiner's comment
would seem to give credence to the view that the movement institutionalizes
liberalism as a political order because the "openness" required by the movement
appears to be one of the essential qualities of a liberal society.
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how does a body of principles that promotes diversity and difference
protect the establishment and manifestation of religious ordering that
seeks to destroy difference and forcibly impose an orthodoxy in
Africa-as both Christianity and Islam, the two major proselytizing
religions, attempted, and in many cases successfully did? Precisely
because of the ethos of universalization common to both, the
messianic faiths sought to eradicate, with the help of the state, all
other forms of religious expression and belief and close off any
avenues through which other competing faiths could be introduced or
sustained. This coerced imposition of a religious orthodoxy implies
a desire and a social philosophy to seek the forcible destruction of
that which is different. Yet, it seems inconceivable that the human
rights movement would have intended to protect the "right" of certain
religions to "destroy" others. In this chapter, I shall attempt to explore
this tension-between protecting the right to proselytize in Africa
while limiting the circumstances in which that right can be exercised
- within the confines of the human rights corpus.
It is my argument that the free exercise of religion and belief
should find protection within the human rights universe in the context
of respect for diversity without giving license to the destruction of
other religions and cultures. While I attempt to explore the nature,
context, and purposes of proselytization in Africa from a rights
perspective, I also seek to see whether proselytization in that context
constituted a human rights violation, and if so, what the response of
the human rights regime should be.
I shall briefly sketch the history of the development of human
rights movement to situate my discussion and provide a context for
my views on religious rights in the African setting. The human rights
movement - that collection of norms, processes, and institutions-is
largely a product of the horrors of the devastating war of 1939-45. Its
rise, development, and elaboration cannot be understood without
resort to the abominations committed by European states and their
agents during that war. Drawing on the Western liberal tradition, the
movement arose primarily to control and contain state action against
the individual. The two principal instruments on which it is based -
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
1999
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- establish negative rights that either limit or prohibit altogether
governmental reach into the private and individual realms. Primarily,
the movement has been restrictive of state power. In the recent past,
however, as the traditional human rights movement has grown in
strength and effect, its language has been appropriated by other
causes which recognize its legitimizing power. Women's groups, gay
and lesbian organizations, environmentalists, and advocates of
economic, social, and cultural rights, all seek recognition by the
"official" human rights movement.
There is a growing realization internationally that the struggle
for human rights is a quest for the reduction of conditions that
engender weakness; in effect, it is a push against the denial of certain
fundamental rights3 by any individual or institution regardless of its
relationship to the state. Certain institutions, such as the family which
traditionally have been part of the private realm, are now coming
under increasing scrutiny to comply with international human rights
standards. The state - the political instrument that gives legal
personality and protection to private institutions - is being pressed to
intervene to secure basic rights for individuals under the control or
influence of entities in the private realm. Advocates base their claims
on the influence or control that the state ought to exercise over such
entities. The challenge for the human rights movement is to move
beyond the singular obsession with wrongs committed directly by the
state - although it remains the most important obligor of the
3 What constitutes a fundamental human right is a subject of great tension and
disagreement within and without the human rights movement. The more traditional
activists in the movement only recognize as legitimate those rights that implicate
raw state power, such as freedom from torture, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary
arrest and detention, denials of procedural due process, and the suppression of free
speech, and assembly and association. More recently, non-Western scholars and
activists have insisted on the indivisibility of human rights and have emphasized
the importance of economic, cultural, social, and group rights. Many in the West
still refuse to recognize these as rights, referring to them instead as 'equities.' This
dichotomization of rights is also a legacy of the logic and struggles of the Cold
War.
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discourse-and invade non-state actors in order to contain and control
human rights violations in the private sphere. To do so, the movement
has to take on powerful private institutions in the private realm,
including established religion. In this paper, I argue that although
religious human rights must be defined, secured, and protected, there
is a correlative duty on the part of religions to respect the human
rights of non-believers and adherents of other religions or faiths and
not to seek their coerced conversion either directly or through the
manipulation and destruction of other cultures. Although Article 18
of the ICCPR guarantees the "right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion," and provides for certain limitations, it does not spell
out the duties that must be borne by proselytizing religions. I attempt
in this article to balance the interests of these religions with those of
African societies, both individual and collective, and to explore ways,
if possible, in which the respectful co-existence between these
radically different spiritualities could be imagined and worked out.
DEMONIZATION: THE UNHOLY VIEW OF "THE OTHER"
The two most geographically diverse religions - Christianity
and Islam - are also the most imperial: they are proselytizing and
universalist, that is, they seek to convert into their faith the entire
human race.4 Although these religions are not spread through physical
violence today, they have historically been forcibly introduced. They
have also been negatively competitive against each other as well as
other creeds as they have fought over the souls of third groups and
4 The designation of non-believers-individuals who do not profess the trinity of
Judaism, Islam, or Christianity-by both Muslims and Christians as either pagans or
infidels is one manifestation of belief in their own superiority over other religions.
Christian missionaries and Islamists evidence this zeal and drive to universalize
through the conversion or salvation of unbelievers from what they regard as eternal
damnation. For a more detailed analysis of the attitude of Shari'a, or Islamic
jurisprudence, towards non-believers. See generally Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im,
Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Political Conditions and Scriptural
Imperatives, HARv. HuM. RTS. J. 3, 13 (1990).
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individuals.5 But central to them is the belief in the racial superiority
of the proselytizers; the other is quite often depicted as inferior. Arab
Muslims, for example, have historically viewed Black Africans as
racially inferior; Islamized Africans are regarded as having taken an
important step towards overcoming that inferiority. The capture and
enslavement of millions of Africans by Arab Muslims over the
centuries bore the trademarks of this theological and racial
justification. It does not require a profound knowledge of history to
prove that both Arab and European perceptions of Africa have been
decidedly racist over the centuries. Asserting that the "Bantu mind"
was inferior to that of the "civilized man," a leading European
missionary described Africans thus:
It is suggested that the mere possession on the part of
the Bantu of nothing but an oral tradition and culture
creates a chasm of difference between the Native
"mind" and that of civilized man, and of itself would
account for a lack of balance and proportion in the
triple psychological function of feeling, thinking and
acting, implying that thinking is the weakest of the
three and that feeling is the most dominant. The
Native seeks not truth nor works, but power - the
5 The wars between the Christian Portuguese and Moslem North Africans are well
documented. In the fifteenth century, the Portuguese under the command of Prince
Henry carried the crusades to Africa as part of the campaign to win back the
continent from Muslims. An admiring portrait of Prince Henry said that the "flame
that lit the Soldier of the Cross was kindled in his heart in early youth, and to win
back Morocco from the Moors was the ambition of his life. He never drew his
sword in any other cause.. . ." See H. DEBRUNNER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY
IN GHANA 15 (1967). Elsewhere, he is called the "commander of the Portuguese
Crusaders' Order of the Knight of Christ." Id. Even among different Christian
denominations, competition for souls often turned violent as evidenced by the
conflict in 1637 between the Dutch and the Catholic Portuguese at historic Elmina,
part of what is today Ghana. A Catholic account of the conflict said that the "new
conquerors, the Dutch, were then bitter enemies of Catholicism. Wherever they
came, they burnt and destroyed the churches and would not allow a Catholic priest
to preach to the people." See H. PFANN, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH IN GHANA 8 (1965).
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dynamical tool.
6
Writing about the importance of evangelization in Africa,
another European missionary asserted that the "Mission to Africa was
the least that we [Europeans] can do to strive to raise him [the
African] in the scale of mankind."7 The catalog of writing by pioneer
missionaries in Africa is inexhaustible and uniquely similar.
Paternalistic at best, African missionaries left no doubt of their belief
in the superiority of their race, religion, and culture, and the necessity
of "freeing" the African from his heathen and sub-human belief and
status.
Such attempts, often quite successful, at the universalization
of the messianic faiths have resulted in untold suffering throughout
history. The religious crusades and jihads waged by both Muslims
and Christians, in which millions were killed and enslaved, are just
one example of the destruction that accompanied or was the excuse
for proselytization. In strange symbolism, the cross, with its linear
structure, becomes a sword once turned on its side.' The causal link,
historically, between evangelization and war appears to be
indisputable. 9 The philosophy and practice of re-making "the other"
6 D. SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND THE PRIMITIVE PEOPLES xix (1938). The
author goes on to write that, "[t]hough he [the Native] relies a good deal on what
he has observed, he will always seek the true cause in the world of unseen powers
above and beyond what we call 'Nature' - in the metaphysical realm in the literal
sense, and his peculiar mental activity is largely due to his lack of distinction
between what is actually present to sense and what is beyond." Id.
7 A.H. BARROW, FIFTY YEARS IN WEST AFRICA 29 (1900).
8 M. Fox, A SPIRITUALITY NAMED COMPASSION 112 (1990); "Crusades,
inquisitions, witch burnings - which invariably meant the burnings of heretics and
gay people, of fellow Christians and of infidels - all in the name of the cross. It is
almost as if Constantine, and his empire's conversion to Christianity in the fourth
century, uttered prophecy when he declared "'in the name of this cross we shall
conquer'. The cross has played the role of weapon time and time again in Christian
history and empire building." Id.
9 See id. Christian armies, much in the same way that Muslim crusaders saw
themselves, considered it an honor to die for Christianity. According to many, "the
supreme sacrifice was to die fighting under the Christian emperor. The supreme
self-immolation was to fall in battle under the standard of the cross .... But by the
1999
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appears therefore to be based on the contempt for that which is
different and belief in the superiority of the aggressive creed. Major
bodies of both Christian and Islamic jurisprudence directly assert the
inferiority of and disrespect for non-believers. Although some
scholars argue that Shari'a, for example, is just one particular
interpretation of the Qur'an, the definitive word of God and
Muhammad, his Prophet, it is the only coherent, unified body of law
for the world's Muslims. 0 Other, more liberal interpretations of Islam
have been of little consequence to the lives of Muslims. Yet Shari'a
itself contradicts basic human rights standards by discriminating
against non-Muslims. Abdullahi An-Na'im, a leading advocate for
reform of Islamic jurisprudence to bring it into conformity with
international human rights standards, has written:
The claim that Shari'a is fully consistent with and has
always protected human rights is problematic both as
a theoretical and 'a practical matter. As a theoretical
matter, the concept of human rights as rights to which
every human being is entitled by virtue of being
human was unknown to Islamic jurisprudence or
social philosophy until the last few decades and does
not exist in Shari'a. Many rights are given under
Sharia in accordance with a strict classification based
on faith and gender and are not given to human
beings as such. As a practical matter, fundamental
inconsistencies exist between Shari'a as practiced in
Muslim countries and current standards of human
rights.11
time Christianity was ready to meet Asia and the New World, the Cross and the
sword were so identified with one another that the sword itself was a cross. It was
the only kind of cross some conquistadors understood." Id.
10 Sharita, the legal and ethical regime of Islam, is derived from both the Qur'an
and the Sunna, the Prophet's collaboration of the Qur'an through his statements and
actions.
I An-Nai'm, supra note 4, at 22 (emphasis added).
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A number of theoretical and scriptural examples illustrate this
point. Unbelievers, defined by Shari'a as non-Muslims except Jews
and Christians or those who do not believe in the "revealed heavenly"
scriptures, 2 are not regarded as fully human and could be legally
enslaved. Shari'a only discusses the manner in which slaves ought to
be treated; it does not prohibit the enslavement of non-believers." 13 in
addition, according to Shari'a, only Muslims can fully enjoy the
benefits of citizenship in an Islamic state. Even members of other
revealed faiths such as Jews or Christians are only entitled to the
lesser status of dhininta under which their security of person and
property is guaranteed with some freedom to practice their own
religion. In return, they have to pay taxes and submit to Islamic rules
in all public matters.14 Shari'a also punishes by execution Muslims
who repudiate their faith. 5 The assumption of the "right" to Islamize
and then prevent others from converting - or counter penetrating - is
at the very least a manifestation of intolerance for difference and
diversity.
Bigoted clergymen and their followers, from South Africa to
the United States, have continuously searched the scriptures for
references to the sub-humanity of Africans to justify apartheid,
slavery, and other violations of basic freedoms based solely on race
and skin color. In the United States and the European colonies and
12 Not surprisingly, the revealed scriptures are only the Bible, the Qu'ran, and
Torah or the Old Testament, the holy books of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism
respectively. It is inexplicable that Shari'a would disregard all other religious
persuasions such as Hinduism and indigenous African or native American
religions, among others, as illegitimate.
'3 An-Nai'm, supra note 4, at 22-23.
14 Id. at 24. An-Nai'm adds that, "non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state can
aspire only to the status of dhimnia under which they would suffer serious
violations of their human rights. Dhimmis are not entitled to equality with Muslims.
Their lives are evaluated as inferior in monetary terms as well: they are not entitled
to the same amount of diya or financial compensation for homicide or bodily harm
as Muslims." Id.
15 The crime of apostasy, which disallows individuals from freely changing their
faith, violates human rights standards by preventing the freedom of choice.
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possessions in Africa, law and religion were often synthesized to
create an oppressive social philosophy in order to justify the
institutionalization of slavery, colonialism, and the ubiquity of white
or European power over blacks. Many settled on the story of the curse
of Noah's son, Ham, in Genesis 9 as the divine curse on all people of
African descent. Religion and pseudo-science were often hand-woven
to "prove" the bestial, sub-human characteristics of Africans. These
philosophies and practices allowed "good" Christians brutally to
subjugate or to acquiesce with a clear conscience in the subjugation
of African cultures and religious traditions.
THE PROCESSES AND EFFECTS OF PROSELYTIZATION IN AFRICA
In this segment, I explore the views of the evangelizer and the
processes of evangelization in Black Africa and raise some of the
human rights issues implied by their penetration of the continent. I
attempt to highlight the tension between proselytization, coupled with
force and power, and respect for difference and cultural identity.
Islam was introduced to Africa through military conquest by the
Arabs. Thereafter, the processes of Arabization (in North Africa and
the Nile Delta) and Islamization (in East and West Africa) proceeded
simultaneously through force, the slave trade, and general commerce.
The entry of Christianity into the continent was no less violent,
coming as it did in partnership with the colonial imperial powers.1
6
Most European missionaries saw their duty in the image painted by
Rudyard Kipling in 1899, "[tlake up the White Man's burden, send
forth the beast ye breed. Go bind your sons to exile to serve your
captives' need. To wait in heavy harness on fluttered folk and wild
16 Many African communities did not see any functional distinctions between the
colonial administrators and the missionaries. "The political factor [colonialism]
worked to the disadvantage of the missionaries in that the Kamba [an ethnic
community in Kenya] like all other Africans, viewed the newcomers in terms of
their local political situation. They identified the missionaries, arriving with the
colonial power which gave them its support and approval, as part of the colonial
authority system, barely distinguishable from administrative officers. In 1913, for
example, elders in Mwala Jarea of Kenya inhabited by the Akamba I went to the
mission at Kabaa to obtain licenses for sugar-mills." Munro, supra note 1, at 104.
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your new-caught, sullen peoples, half-devil, half-child."17 A
missionary who worked among Zimbabweans early in the twentieth
century exemplified these beliefs; to him, "unlettered" Natives were
in "the technically barbaric and pre-literacy stage of cultural and
social development.' 8 In a book written for those "responsible for the
development of a primitive people or are concerned for their progress
missionary and administrator, government official and teacher,
employer and civilian,"' 9 the missionary stated starkly:
Indeed, primitive people all over the world who have
not yet acknowledged a sovereignty of reason arm
themselves with similar weapons against their
physical and spiritual foes and have the same
elemental passions, emotions and instincts.
Institutions and beliefs such as initiation ceremonies,
the medicine-man, witchcraft, and all the
magico-religious assumptions are part and parcel of
the lives of such peoples.20
In contrast, Christianity which has undergone "centuries of
theological learning," "labour of intellect, and subtlety of reasoning
throughout its whole history, stands for a literary type of religion
giving prominence to beliefs that can be put into ideas as dogma and
doctrine."' That is why, according to the missionary, he was
"amazed at my own impertinence in desiring to impose a new and
strange religion and culture upon a primitive people with whose
17 K. KITEME, WE, THE PAN-AFRICANS: ESSAYS ON THE GLOBAL BLACK
EXPERIENCE 94 (1992).
18 SHROPSHIRE, THE CHURCH AND THE PRIMITIVE PEOPLES, xiii.
19 Id. The author develops a methodology for evangelization in "primitive"
cultures and pleads for the "careful discrimination, preservation, transmutation and
transformation of the religious and cultural institutions and beliefs of the Southern
Bantu [the African peoples: of southern Africa], by and within a full-orbed
yresentation of the Christian religion." Id. at xix.
Id. at xiii-xiv.
21 Id. at xxiv.
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cultural inheritance I was quite unacquainted."2 2 Hence he advises,
"[b]efore sowing, know your ground."2 3 He emphasizes that the
purpose of the evangelist is not "merely to civilize but to Christianize,
not merely to convey the Gifts of Civilization."'24
European missionaries, sociologists, and anthropologists have
historically treated African religions as bizarre and primitive
phenomena completely different from and inferior to the messianic
faiths. Part of this process of demonization betrays the prejudice,
ignorance, and the cultural vantage point of the outsider. Hence the
description of Africans as heathens and pagans. Many of the writers
and missionaries describe African religions as superstitious,
unscientific, and without reason. Missionaries therefore sought to
discredit and dismantle those African religions and cultural
expressions that they deemed un-Christian or resistant to
Christianization and Westernization. Some missionaries, however,
did not advocate the full destruction of "false religions" but rather a
process of "assimilation":
It is becoming increasingly clear, and governors and
missionaries alike are coming to realize, that the
method of the destruction of religion and culture of
primitive races, as happened in the cases of the
Tasmanians, Australians... and American Indians is
both scandalous and futile. For such a method
destroys all the values that give meaning and zest to
their lives, rendering them impotent and ill-equipped
to face the future, cutting them loose from all their
moorings on a vast and uncharted sea where they drift
22 Id. at xiii.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 425.
25 Id. See E. AYIsi, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF AFRICAN CULTURE 57
(1972): "It has been said that they [African religions] lack any theological ideas and
all the elements which make Judaism, Islam or Christianity sublime are lacking in
African religion. People who should have known better, especially missionaries,
were completely misguided about African religion, and by their muddled thinking
propagated erroneous ideas about African religious beliefs."
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to despair and finally destruction.26
This paternalistic approach, which sought to "secure, at
whatever cost, the fullness of the development of the personality of
the African," would not simply target African religions but would be
a "concerted attempt" in the "spheres of religion, law, medicine,
politics and economics for the simple reason that the life of those we
are seeking to transform is all of a piece., 27 In this process of
re-education, missionaries ended up denouncing as satanic African
ceremonies and actions of worship for the spirit world. African
dances, marriage ceremonies, female circumcision, and polygamy
were deemed pagan or heathen practices incompatible with
Christianity. Among the Kikuyu and Akamba of Kenya; for example,
parents who permitted female circumcision were not allowed access
to churches and schools, although the practice was deeply bound up
with other cultural norms.2" As one writer has mildly put it:
The missionaries, as even devout Christians will
admit, were extremely narrow in outlook. They taught
that Christianity was the only right religion and that
all other religions and practices must stop. Such
26 SHROPSHIRE, supra note 18, at 425.
27 Id. A more forceful method was favored by others as this description of Henry
the Navigator reveals, "The heathen lands were kingdoms to be won for Christ, and
the guidance of their backward races was a duty that must not be shirked. Henry
shouldered this responsibility. If he had the spirit of a crusader, he had that of a
missionary as well. Wherever he explored, his aim was to evangelise, to civilise,
and to educate the simple natives.... He sent out teachers and preachers to the black
men on the Senegal [river]." H. DEBRUNNER, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN
GHANA, 15.
28 In most African cultures, the private/public distinction appears to have been
absent or insignificant in the construction of social and political reality. Earthly
existence constituted one whole: life was at once social, political, religious,
cultural, and economic. The state (or the socio-political organism for the orderly
running of the community, such as the council of elders) among many of the Bantu
peoples of East Africa, was not apart from the community or contradictory to it.
Life was one continuum, neither wholly private nor completely public. Religion
has permeated every aspect of life.
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teaching confused the Africans, who believed that all
religions were good.29
The deliberate destruction of African values was epitomized
by the introduction of a "white" god and Jesus Christ and a "black"
devil or Satan. The visual images displayed and popularized by
missionaries to date - drawings and other impressions of Jesus Christ,
the Virgin Mary, and God - are those of whites with blue eyes and
long, usually blond, hair. Verbal and written descriptions of these
figures also gave the impression that they were European. Growing
up in Africa as a young boy - and my experience was typical - I
thought that God was a silver haired white sage resident somewhere
in the deep blue sky. The system of formal education introduced by
the missionaries and the colonial authorities emphasized the
superiority of Europe over the rest of the world. This educational and
religious orientation was meant to disembowel, and did so, African
traditional outlooks and replace them with Western, Judeo-Christian
conceptions of life.
The alliance between, and in many cases the practical fusion
of the Church and the colonial flag, even where naked force was not
applied, served to quash African values. As a reaction to the
Eurocentric and racist curricula of the mission schools, together with
29 THROUGH AFRICAN EYES: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 81 (L. Clark ed., 1970).
See also A. Mazrui, Africa and Other Civilizations: Conquest and
Counterconquest, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS 77-78 (J. Harbeson ed., 1991).
"Indigenous African religions, on the other hand, are basically communal rather
than universalist As with Hinduism and modem Judaism - and unlike Christianity
and Islam -indigenous African traditions have not sought to convert all of mankind.
The Yoruba do not seek to convert the Ibo to the Yoruba religion, or vice-versa.
Nor do the Yoruba or the lbo compete with each other for the souls of a third
group. By not being proselytizing religions, indigenous African creeds have not
fought with each other." Mazrui thinks that Africa probably did not experience
religious wars before the arrival of Christianity and Islam. He attributes the lack of
religious wars in pre-Islamic, pre-Christian Africa to the non-proselytizing nature
of indigenous religious and traditions.
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their opposition to African cultural and religious practices such as
female circumcision, Africans in Kenya started in the late 1920s to
establish independent schools under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta,
later the first president of Kenya. This frontal attack on religious
values and practices and ethnic and racial identities developed over
hundreds of years was particularly damaging because religion was an
integral part of being African.30 African religious beliefs centered
individual and group existence; their subversion overthrew ethnic
identities. The devaluation of their culture dehumanized Africans and
created a self-hatred that continues to devour the continent today.
Predictably, different denominations of Christianity, primarily
the Protestant and Roman Catholic, introduced bitter rivalries
between African communities. The rivalry engendered by the
competition for converts created deep political antagonisms between
ethnic groups and introduced one more cleavage in societies already
destabilized by colonization. In countries like Uganda, these sectarian
rivalries have periodically erupted into ethno-political violence. In
countries such as Sudan or Nigeria, the primary source of violence
has been inter-religious: between Muslims and Christians.3'
It was not the purpose of this segment to document the
destruction of African religions and cultural values through the
agencies of the messianic religions and colonialism. My purpose was
to explore the views of the missionaries and the methods employed
30 According to a leading African scholar, religion is an essential element of
African culture. "Africans are notoriously religious, and each people has its own
religious system with a set of beliefs and practices. Religion permeates into all the
departments of life so fully that it is not easy to isolate it." See J. MBrrI, AFRICAN
RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 1 (1970).
31 Since independence, successive Sudanese governments-which have been
dominated exclusively by Sudanese Arabs - have sought to force Islam on Black
Africans who are adherents of African traditional religions and Christianity in the
south. In Nigeria, political instability - and the resultant inability to create a viable,
economically prosperous society in spite of enormous material and human
resources - must be attributed, at least partially, to the religious animosities between
Muslims in the north and Christians in the south, a cleavage that also corresponds
with ethnicity.
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in their work. There is little doubt that the coupling of Islam with
force and Christianity with the colonial state - with a technologically
superior base - virtually assured the decimation of indigenous
religions or, at the very least, the imposition of alien religions. The
material and military resources available to the colonial
administrators enabled them to crush resistance and establish political
hegemony. From their privileged vantage points, the missionaries
utilizing equally sophisticated means of pacification and
communication - were able to force and pressure whole communities
to abandon their indigenous faiths if they hoped to benefit from the
new order. In all probability, the dismantling of African religions and
cultures - even under colonialism - would have been much more
difficult without the combination of proselytization with racism.
According to Basil Davidson, the Africanist, none of this was an
accident or a mistake:
By racism I mean the conscious and systematic
weapon of domination, of exploitation, which first
saw its demonic rise with the onset of the trans-
Atlantic trade in African captives sold into slavery,
and which, later, led on to the imperialist colonialism
of our yesterdays.
This racism was not a "mistake," a
"misunderstanding" or a "grievous deviation from the
proper norms of behavior." It was not an accident of
human error. It was not an unthinking reversion to
barbarism. On the contrary, this racism was conceived
as the moral justification - the necessary justification,
as it was seen by those in the white man's world who
were neither thieves or moral monsters -for doing to
blackpeople what church and state no longer thought
it permissible to do to white people: the justification
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for enslaving black people .... 32
INDIGENOUS RELIGIONS AND THE LAW: A LACUNA
The subject of indigenous religions is one of the most
underdeveloped areas of inquiry in human rights. Indeed, it remains
a question whether the view adopted by the human rights corpus on
the freedom of religion, belief, and conscience - in Article 18 of both
the UDHR and ICCPR - took into account indigenous religions and
their historical relationship with messianic faiths. In this segment, I
shall briefly examine what protections, if any, are afforded
indigenous religions in the human rights regime and in several
African countries. For the purposes of my argument, I shall not
attempt to define the complex and contentious term "indigenous
peoples." Instead, I shall focus my attention on "indigenous religions"
which I define as non-messianic faiths but excluding dominant and
politically established religions such as Judaism, Buddhism, and
Hinduism. The key to the inclusion of a religion as indigenous is its
history of attack and domination by the imperial faiths and
colonialism and its status as the cultural inheritance and spiritual
expression of the original, non-white, non-Arabic peoples of Africa.33
But I also examine United Nations documents regarding the cultural
rights of indigenous peoples to indicate how the human rights regime
might consider thinking about the protection of indigenous religions.
The UDHR and the ICCPR do not specially recognize
indigenous religions in relation to dominant faiths or cultures; they do
not even refer to them. Article 18 simply provides the right of
everyone "to freedom of thought, conscience and religion" and
prohibits the use of coercion to "impair" the freedom of others to
have or to adopt a religion or a belief of their choice. The freedom to
32 B. DAVIDSON, AFRICAN CIVILIZATION REVISITED 34 (1991) (emphasis added).
33 Simply put, I define as indigenous all African traditional religions which
predated Islamization and Christianization. Similarly, the term could also be used
to denote the religious beliefs of native, non-settler peoples in the Americas and
parts of Asia.
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"manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject to such limitations
as are prescribed by law" or limited to protect public "morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 34 This provision
prohibits the use of force to make converts as was the case in early
European crusades in Africa and the conquest of parts of the
continent by Arab Muslims. It would also appear to disallow using
state resources-such as educational, health, and other services - to
disadvantage particular faiths. Missionaries who worked against other
religions with the help of colonial regimes would seem to be in
violation of this provision.
While no authoritative human rights body has issued a
definitive interpretation of such construction, the Human Rights
Committee35 recently adopted a General Comment36 on Article 27 of
the ICCPR,37 providing that states are under an obligation to protect
the cultural, linguistic, and religious rights of minorities. It said, in
part:
Although the rights protected under Article 27 are
individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of
the minority group to maintain its culture, language or
religion. Accordingly positive measures by States
may also be necessary to protect the identity of a
34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted 16 Dec. 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art 18 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976)
hereinafter ICCPR].
The ICCPR, the principal civil and political rights human rights treaty,
establishes the Human Rights Committee, the body responsible for the elaboration,
interpretation, and the encouragement of the impfementation of the treaty. See
ICCPR, supra note 34, art. 28.
36 Article 40(4) of the ICCPR directs the Human Rights Committee to "study"
state reports and to "transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may
consider appropriate." The general comments are meant to be authoritative
interpretations of the ICCPR's provisions.
37 Article 27 of the ICCPR provides that "in those States in which ethnic, religious
or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with others members of the group, to enjoy their
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their language."
Id. art. 27.
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minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and
develop their culture and language and to practice
their religion, in community with other members of
the group.
38
In its 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief,39 the
United Nations did not address the subject of indigenous religions.
The Declaration was little more than an elaboration of article 18 of
the ICCPR.
Some more recent developments, however, indicate a
willingness to recognize indigenous religions within the ambit of
the United Nations. Through the relentless and focused advocacy
of indigenous peoples and their supporters, the General Assembly
in 1992 instructed the Working Group on Indigenous Populations
to draft a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for
consideration by the Commission on Human Rights.40 The Draft
Declaration, which now awaits action by the Commission on
Human Rights, explicitly recognizes indigenous religions and goes
further than any other United Nations document in recognizing the
rights of indigenous peoples and protecting their indigenous
religions.
The Draft Declaration, in dramatic and definitive language,
affirms in the preamble that, "all doctrines, policies and practices
based on or advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the
basis of national origin, racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences
are racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable
38 General Comment No. 23, para 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.I/Add.5,1994.
39 Proclaimed by the General Assembly Resolution 36/55 of November 25,1981.
United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments (New
York, 1993), 122-125.
40 The Working Group on Indigenous Populations was established in 1982 by the
United Nations as a subsidiary body of the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, itself an expert body of the UN
Commission on Human Rights.
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and socially unjust... .,4'
The Draft Declaration would find unacceptable the
philosophical and theological assumptions propagated by
missionaries in Africa; the demonization of African religions as
backward and inferior would violate the letter and spirit of the
document. Elsewhere, the Draft Declaration protects indigenous
peoples from any "adverse discrimination, in particular based on their
indigenous origin and identity. '42 More importantly, the Draft
Declaration prohibits "cultural genocide" and disallows "any form of
assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways - of life imposed
on them .... ,4' In a sweeping assertion of sovereignty, the Draft
Declaration appears to prohibit all forms of advocacy or
proselytization by agents external to the indigenous culture when it
calls for the "prevention of and redress for," among other things, "any
form of propaganda directed at them [that is, indigenous peoples]."4
The objective of this reasoning is to create space in which indigenous
peoples and their cultures are left alone by external agents including
imperial religions. If adopted, the Draft Declaration would provide
guidance for the human rights movement in understanding indigenous
religions and creating processes to protect them.
While the protection of indigenous cultures appears to be
gaining international currency, African states remain uninterested in
reclaiming the pre-colonial past and restoring those aspects of
traditional norms and values, including elements of spirituality, which
were discredited during the colonial era. The lack of interest in the
past is partially due to its thorough demonization and the shame and
backwardness with which the Westernized and Christianized or
Islamized ruling African elites associate it. Good culture in Africa
today is defined by its distance from traditional cultures and
41 See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 46th Session, Agenda Item 15, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/Add. 1 (1994). [hereinafter Draft Declaration].
42 Draft Declaration, art. 2.
43 Id. art. 7 (d).44 Id. art. 7 (e).
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proximity to Western values. In many instances, African states
continue to carry out "modernization" campaigns against "backward
peoples" such as the Masai of Kenya and Tanzania. So-called African
customary laws, for example, are ordinarily overridden by received
colonial laws in most legal systems and jurisdictions in Africa. In
many African countries, there have been no national debates to
evaluate and contextualize African customs and laws within the
modem state. Many traditional practices, from polygamy to
traditional healing and worship, which were discredited by the
colonial state, are actively prohibited and punished by the new
African-led governments. In this process of continued acculturation,
African religions have been one of the major casualties of the culture
of imitation.
The exception to the general disregard of the African past is
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the continental
human rights instrument adopted by the Organization of African
Unity in 1981. 41 In its preamble, the African Charter recognizes the
"virtues" of Africa's traditions and its civilization. Elsewhere, it
imposes upon individual Africans the "duty to preserve and
strengthen positive African values," although it neither spells out
those values or mentions African religions.46 But its use of the word
"positive" betrays a Eurocentric bias and implies that there is much
that is negative in African culture. The only reference to religion is a
boiler plate provision, taken mainly from the ICCPR, that protects
religious freedom.47
Predictably, African constitutions and laws have since
independence from colonial rule been of little help in addressing the
problem. A survey of the constitutions of several African states make
45 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted 26 June 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. A/CAB/LEG/67/3, Rev. 5 (entered into force 12 Oct. 1986), reprinted
in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982)[hereinafter the African Charter]. It establishes a continental
human rights system by creating the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, its implementing body. Although widely criticized as lacking in
effectiveness, the Commission remains the only continent-wide human rights body.
46 Id. art. 29 (7).
47 Id. art. 8.
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no mention of indigenous religions choosing instead to provide the
generic protection of religious freedom contained in international
human rights instruments.48 The wording of several other
constitutions suggests that some forms of evangelization may be
restricted.49 The constitution of Zambia, for example, guarantees the
freedom of religion except that limitations could be placed to "ensure
that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms of any one
individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others."'
The constitution of Mauritius seems to limit attempts at
proselytization by protecting "the right to observe and practice any
religion or belief without the unsolicited intervention of persons
professing any other religion or belief."'" Although the laws
respecting indigenous religions is quite thin if not lacking, the general
orientation of the policies of most African states has been hostile to
pre-colonial, pre-Islamic, or pre-Christian values but very protective
of one or both of the messianic faiths. In many cases, states continue
to actively prosecute campaigns to root out "unenlightened" customs
and traditions.
IDEALS VERSUS REALITIES: THE DILEMMA
The two basic human rights documents - the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights - seek to entrench and encourage the free
exchange of ideas5" and the respect for difference and diversity. The
48 See, e.g., The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979, Section 27 (1); The
Constitution of Mozambique, 1975, Article 33; The Constitution of Mali, 1977,
Section 11.
49 See The Constitution of Mauritius, 1971, Section 11 5 (b); The Constitution of
Zimbabwe, 1980, Section 19 5 (b).
50 The Constitution of Zambia, 1974, Section 13.
51 The Constitution of Mauritius, 1971, Section 11 5 (b). The Constitution of
Zimbabwe, 1980, Section 19 5 (b), repeats almost verbatim the corresponding
section of the Constitution of Mauritius.
52 Article 19 of the UDHR provides, "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
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emphasis placed on the importance of creating and maintaining a
diverse society is one of the most striking characteristics of human
rights law. Diversity is encouraged, though not required, by the rights
corpus in cultural, religious, political, and other endeavors and
pursuits. Through this emphasis, human rights law "evidences
throughout its hostility to imposed uniformity."'53 According to
Henry Steiner:
The ideal of encouraging and protecting diversity
informs many human rights provisions. No other
norm in the human rights corpus plays as vital a role
in the struggle to realize that ideal as the principle of
equal protection, perhaps the preeminent human rights
norm. Its premise of the equal worth of individuals
and their right to equal respect necessarily applies to
the ethnic groups with which individuals are
associated, for discrimination has the same systemic
character whether it is directed against a group or
selectively against a member.S
4
Indeed, Article 26 of the ICCPR prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. Article 27
affirms the same philosophy by requiring states to - make sure that
minorities shall not be denied the right to enjoy their own culture and
to profess and practice their own religion." Elsewhere, the ICCPR
repeatedly confirms its adherence to difference by protecting the
rights of persons to assemble peacefully 6 and to associate freely with
media and regardless of frontiers." Article 19 of the ICCPR is the equivalent
provision although it warns that these rights carry "special duties and
responsibilities" and are therefore subject to "certain restrictions" for the "respect
of the rights ... of others" and for the protection of "national security or of public
order (ordrepublic), or public health and morals." ICCPR, supra note 34, art. 19.
53 Steiner, supra note 2, at 1548.
54 Id. (emphasis added).
55 ICCPR, supra note 34, art. 27.
56 Id. art. 21.
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others.57 Lawful restrictions, however, could be imposed on the basis
of national security, the protection of public health or morals, or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.5" Although it is clear
that human rights law is obsessed with the creation, protection, and
preservation of diversity, it is also clear that rights advancing this
ideal-which is central to the movement could also be curtailed to
protect the rights of others.
This propagation of diversity through the freedom to
exchange ideas and to associate across divides and traditional
cleavages such as race, religion, culture, national origin, and gender
by human rights law assumes-an assumption that is still being tested
- that there is inherent benefit in cross-fertilization or contact with
"othemess." When the ICCPR declares, for example, the "freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, '59 it presupposes, without final proof, an
ultimate good in the exercise of that right. There are presumed
"goods"- growth, vitality, search for truth, and new challenges - that
would benefit humanity from interaction, difference, and diversity.
Ethnic separation - whether voluntary or enforced - is not preferred;
instead, openness and transparency towards "the other" might nurture
respect for difference and reduce bigotry and demonization. These
assumptions raise certain difficulties that I will return to later.
With regard to the right to religious belief, the ICCPR grants
a wide latitude:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his
choice, and freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance,
practice and teaching.60
57 Id. art. 22.
58 Id. art. 22 (2).
59 Id. art. 19 (2).
60 Id. art. 18 (1).
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Significantly, the covenant also provides that no one shall "be
subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.",6' Additionally, the freedom
to "manifest one's religion or beliefs," could be lawfully limited on
the grounds of public safety, order, health, or morals or "the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others." 62 Article 18 of the
UDHR also provides for the "right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion."
Taken together, the provisions advocating difference and
diversity and those providing explicitly for religious rights, would
seem to allow proselytization by the messianic religions, although
they also provide for certain limitations which might be read as
possibly excluding certain modes of evangelization. For example,
proselytization through force, coercion, or in the context of
colonization would appear to be excluded.
Although human rights law amply protects the right to
proselytize through the principles of free speech, assembly, and
association, the "pecking" order of rights problematizes the right to
evangelize where the result is the destruction of other cultures or the
closure of avenues for other religions. It is my argument that the most
fundamental of all human rights is that of self-determination63 and
that no other right overrides it. Without this fundamental group or
individual right, no other human right could be secured, since the
group would be unable to determine for its individual members under
what political, social, cultural, economic, and legal order they would
live. Any right which directly conflicts with this right ought to be
void to the extent of that conflict. Traditionally, the
61 Id. art. 19 (2).
62 Id. art. 18 (3).
63 ICCPR, supra note 34, art. 1, "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination,
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue
their economic, social and cultural development." Article One of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the other treaty which together
with the ICCPR and the UDHR makes the so-called International Bill of Human
Rights, is identically worded.
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self-determination principle has been employed to advance the cause
of decolonization or to overcome other forms of external occupation.
The principle was indispensable to the decolonization process. This
usage of the principle - as a tool for advancing demands for external
self-determination - could be expanded to disallow cultural and
religious imperialism or imposition by external agencies through
acculturation, especially where the express intent of the "invading"
culture or religion, as was the case in Africa, is to destroy its
indigenous counterparts and seal off the entry or growth of other
traditions. Furthermore, the principle could also be read to empower
internal self-determination, that is, the right of a people to "cultural
survival. ' ' 4 This usage of self-determination is advanced by the Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. It is also an
argument against cultural genocide. It is one of the ideas advanced by
advocates of autonomy regimes for minorities: unless groups are
given protection against invasion and control by others, their cultural
and ethnic identities could be quashed by more powerful cultures and
political systems. The violent advocacy of the messianic religions in
Africa could be seen as a negation of this right particularly because
religion is often the first point of attack in the process of
acculturation.
Christianity and Islam forcibly entered Africa not as guests
but as masters.65 The two traditions came either as conquerors or on
the backs of conquerors. As they had done elsewhere, they were
driven by the belief and conviction of their own innate superiority -
and conversely what they saw as barbaric African religions and
cultures. This belief was not a function of an objective assessment
and reflection about African religions and cultures. It was born of the
contempt and ignorance of that which was different and the
exaggerated importance of the messianic faiths. The messianic
64 See Steiner, supra note 2, at 1545-1547.
65 Christians and Muslims came to Africa to holy wage war, as it were, and to
subjugate and eradicate indigenous religions and cultures. They did not come to
persuade; they came to conquer and did indeed conquer. This is a contradiction of
the right to self-determination.
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religions - Christianity to be precise - came to Africa at a time of
great technological and scientific imbalance between the West and
the continent. Already the beneficiaries of the industrial revolution,
the colonial church and state commanded superior resources in the
areas of the military, economic organization and finance, the media,
and other social and political spheres. Africa was no match, and the
successful imposition of colonialism is proof of that fact. The West
was able through coercion, intimidation, trickery, and force to impose
a new political, social, cultural, and thanks to the missionaries,
religious order in Africa. African political, social, and religious
traditions were delegitimized virtually overnight.
Thus begun the process of de-Africanization through
large-scale cash-crop farming for European industries,
industrialization, urbanization, and the wholesale subversion of
traditional values and structures. Africa - from top to bottom - was
re-made in the image of Europe complete with Eurocentric modem
states. Christianity played a crucial role in this process: weaning
Africans from their roots and pacifying them for the new order.
Utilizing superior resources, it occupied most political space and
practically killed local religious traditions and then closed off society
from other persuasions. It is in this sense that the practice of colonial
Christian advocacy constituted a violation of the fundamental
freedoms of Africans. Islam, which had invaded Africa at an earlier
date, was equally insidious and destructive of local religions. Its
forceful conversions and wars of conquest together with its
prohibition of its repudiation, were violative of the rights of Africans
as well.
CONCLUSIONS
Individuals do not exist in the atomized language prevalent in
the human rights movement. Usually, individuals, even in the
industrial democracies of the West, are members of an ethnic, social,
religious, or political group. Quite often, a single individual will fall
under several classifications. Although many of the rights enumerated
in human rights law attach to individuals, they only make sense in a
collective, social perspective. This is the case because the creation or
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development of a culture or a religion are societal, not individual,
endeavors. I make this point to underline the importance of culture or
religion to individuals and groups. An individual's morals, attitudes
towards life and death, and identity come from this collective
construction of reality through history.
No one culture or religion is sovereign in relationship to any
other culture or religion. From the perspective of the human rights
movement, all cultures are equal. This view rejects the notion that
there is a hierarchy of cultures or religions; that some cultures are
superior to others even though technologically they may be more
advanced. Belief in the contrary has led to military invasions to
"civilize," colonize, and enslave, as was the case with Christianity in
Africa. Cultures, however, have always interacted throughout history;
there are no pure cultures, as such, although many traditions retain
their distinctive personality. In many cases, the voluntary, unforced
commingling of cultures has led to a more vital and creative
existence. Several lessons can be drawn from this premise. The
human rights movement should encourage the crossbreeding of
cultures and tolerance for diversity. It should also frown upon
homogenization and the imposition of uniformity.
As I mentioned at the beginning, the human rights movement
is premised on societies being open to new ideas and challenges; even
when a creed seeks homogenization, it must be open to persuasion
from other traditions. Although I agree with and share this basic ideal
of the human rights corpus, I am deeply concerned that the
movement's central tenets may support forms of advocacy that negate
certain rights and give legitimacy to abusive conduct. In the case of
Africa, the arrival of Christianity, for example, was so violent
towards indigenous traditions that the possibility of the free exchange
of values and a voluntary commingling was non-existent. The
missionaries and the colonial authorities defined local cultures as
demonic; one had to choose between the old and the new. The new
ways were promoted as the salvation from a satanic past. Progress,
culture, and humanity were identified entirely in Islamic or Christian
terms, never with reference to indigenous traditions. But the new
converts could not become fully "Christian" or "European"; many, to
this day, remain suspended between a dim African past and a
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distorted, Westernized existence. Many have been robbed of their
humanity.
It was not the intention of this article to circumscribe religious
human rights. I share with other scholars and activists in the human
rights movement the importance of protecting religious human rights
and enjoining governments from unduly burdening or prohibiting the
free exercise of religion. But I am concerned by those dimensions of
messianic religions that claim a right not merely to persuade
individuals or groups of peoples of the "truth" as they see it but rather
actively demonize, systematically discredit, and forcibly destroy and
eventually replace non-universalist, non-competitive, indigenous
religions. Quite often, indigenous religions anchor a total worldview
and their destruction usually entails a fundamental distortion of ethnic
identities and history.
Perhaps there is nothing that can be done today to reverse the
negative effects of forced or coerced religious proselytization during
the era of colonialism in Africa. Nor is it possible to reclaim wholly
the African past as though history has stood still. This does not mean,
however, that we should simply forget the past and go on as if
nothing happened. The anguish and deprivation caused by that
historical experience is with me and millions of other Africans today.
We bear the marks of that terrible period. For those Africans who
choose not to be Christians or Muslims, the past is not really an
option: it was so effectively destroyed and delegitimized that it is
practically impossible to retrieve. It is this loss that I mourn and for
which I blame Christianity and Islam. The human rights corpus
should outlaw those forms of proselytization used in Africa, because
their purpose and effect have been the dehumanization of an entire
race of people. It could do so by elaborating a treaty that addresses
religious human rights but provides for the protection and
mechanisms of redress for forms of proselytization that seek to
unfairly assimilate or impose dominant cultures on indigenous
religion.
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